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Abstract
Using the dismantling of trade quotas on Chinese textile and clothing products in conjunction
with China’s accession to the WTO and an employer-employee matched data-set for the period
1999 to 2010, workers’ adjustments to intensified low-wage competition is analyzed. Utilizing
within-industry heterogeneity in workers’ exposure to this trade shock, results reveal negative
and significant impact of the low-wage import shock on workers’ future earnings and employment
trajectories. The abolishment of quotas leads to higher likelihood of unemployment and shorter
future tenure for workers. While most workers employed by firms exposed to low-wage competition
are influenced negatively to a similar extent at the exposed employer, the degree of adjustment to
the initial shock varies greatly across different types of workers. In particular less-educated, older
and those who had elementary occupations or occupations that require industry-specific training
at the exposed firms had the worst adjustment experience. The results suggest that adjustment
costs are very important and heterogeneous across different types of workers and highlight the
need for targeting specific groups in assistance and adjustment schemes.
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1 Introduction
The distributional impact of globalization is an important dimension of the public debate that
currently shapes the climate of economic policy making. While economic theory emphasizes the
overall net benefits of globalization, in the short run the benefits of globalization are unequally
distributed among economic actors within countries, of whom some may even lose out. It
is often claimed that blue-collar manufacturing workers in advanced countries bear short-run
costs of globalization as they find themselves in competition with much cheaper workers in
low-wage countries. Supporting such claims, by utilizing the dramatic surge of Chinese goods
in the world trade over a short span of time in recent years, many studies document significant
labor reallocation in manufacturing industries as a result of Chinese competition (e.g. Bernard,
Jensen, Schott (2006), Bloom, Draca, Van Reenen (2011), Autor, Dorn, Hanson (2013), Utar
and Torres-Ruiz (2013)). However these studies do not answer how manufacturing workers,
displaced from their workplaces due to competition with China, adjust.
Very recently Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2013) documented that American workers under
direct threat from low-wage import competition have lower cumulative earnings, higher risks of
exiting the labor force and higher likelihood of receiving public disability support. Contributing
to the literature on workers’ adjustment to trade shocks, in this paper I analyze the impact
of Chinese competition on workers’ outcomes in a European country with a generous social
net and active labor market policies. I utilize the exogenous expiration of the Multi-fiber
Arrangement (MFA) quotas for China to identify workers who were employed in Danish firms
that were hit by cheaper imports from China, and analyze the impact of a Chinese import
shock on workers’ future earnings and employment.
I follow workers employed in the textile and clothing sector (T&C) in 1999, and examine
how they adjust to the globalization shock due to the removal of MFA quotas for China in
conjunction with its WTO membership over the period 2002 to 2010. To do that, I first
identify firms that domestically produce products that were subject to MFA quotas. Then,
using matched employer-employee level data, I identify workers who were employed in affected
firms before the WTO accession of China. I then measure differential outcomes of these affected
workers relative to other T&C workers over the years 2002-2010 after controlling for detailed
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worker and workplace characteristics and industry-wide aggregate shocks.
Technological forces are among important factors that cause decline in manufacturing em-
ployment in advanced countries (Machin and Van Reenen (1998)). Especially, labor-intensive
industries such as the T&C industry have been shrinking since the 1960s due to factors that
include both low-wage competition and technological changes. Hence it is vital to be able to
distinguish the impact of the trade shock from other factors. The empirical strategy in this pa-
per directly utilizes the change in trade policy, rather than relying on import measures that are
potentially contaminated with domestic demand and supply factors. In addition, by producing
estimates that are relative to other T&C workers facing the same technological and demand
shocks, this study is able to disentangle the impact of trade shock on workers’ outcomes from
other factors and thus derive causal implications.
Using individual worker-level, firm-level and product-level data from Statistics Denmark, and
exploiting an exogenous abolishment of the trade quotas for China, I show that MFA quota
abolishment for China leads to significant declines in Danish workers’ earnings over the period
2002-2010. The MFA quota abolishment also leads to higher likelihood of switching to service
sector jobs. Results further show higher likelihood of unemployment and shorter future tenure
for workers but not a higher likelihood of leaving the labor market altogether. The main chan-
nels through which the trade shock affects workers are found to be a shorter employment spell
at the firm that was exposed to the competition shock and subsequent difficulty in maintaining
stable employment.
The results presented in this paper provide a point of comparison from another advanced
country with a Nordic social system with the findings by Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song
(2014) from American workers’ adjustment to the Chinese trade shock. The results show that
the significant negative effect on workers’ labor earnings of Chinese imports is not particular to
the US economy. The nature of the US data prevents Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014)
from examining whether their documented reductions in per year earnings were due to loss
in hours worked or hourly wages. The results in this paper show that the main adjustment
channel of the negative shock operated on the quantity margin in Denmark (number of hours
worked instead of hourly rates). These results are consistent with the general structure of the
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Danish labor market which is characterized by very liberal hiring-firing regulations with a high
degree of unionization1 and allow an informed discussion of whether institutional differences
play an important role in shaping the adjustment mechanism.
Previous literature investigating the question of whether trade with lower wage countries was
an important factor in driving the increase in income inequality observed in the 1980s and
1990s in many advanced countries did not find strong empirical support in comparison to
alternative explanations such as technology factors.2 Studies in this literature mostly focus
on wage changes within the manufacturing sector3, while results presented here show that
workers’ movement to the service sector is an integral part of the adjustment and indicate that
focusing only on the manufacturing sector will not provide a complete picture of the potential
impact of trade shocks on wages.
MFA quotas, while economically important and substantial (Khandelwal, Schott and Wei
(2013), Brambilla, Khandelwal and Schott (2010), Utar (forthcoming)), concern only textile
and clothing products. Empirical literature on labor market outcomes in response to trade
shocks mostly focus on economy-wide trade liberalization episodes.4 In addition to helping
establish causality, examining removal of MFA quotas to analyze workers’ adjustment to low-
wage import shock also helps releasing results from general equilibrium effects and spill-overs
from other industries that normally cause convoluted results when examining general trade
liberalization episodes.
The data also allow me to examine the differential impact of low-wage competition according
to worker and firm characteristics. I find that workers are more or less homogeneously affected
by the import shock via their employment at a firm exposed to the competition. However
heterogeneity across workers was found to matter significantly as workers adjust to the shock
1The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 ranks Denmark 6th among 148 countries at hiring and firing
practices, indicating very de-regulated hiring and firing practices (US is ranked 9th in the same ranking), while
it is ranked 93rd for flexibility of wage determination.
2In the US, for example, the share of income received by the lowest quintile of households fell from 4.4 % in
1977 to 3.6 % in 1997, while the share of income received by the highest quintile of households has risen from
43.6 to 49.4 % over the same period (Feenstra (2000)).
3Contribution to this literature includes Revenga (1992), Hanson and Harrison (1999) among others.
4For a recent example, see Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011).
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after displacement. Particularly college educated workers have an easier time finding alter-
native jobs in the service sector that can allow them to compensate relatively quickly for the
earnings loss incurred at the exposed employer. Workers with vocational and lower level of
education on the other hand are not found to be as lucky in finding and keeping jobs that can
help them recover from the bad shock. Mid-aged displaced workers tend to stay within the
sector relative to older and younger cohorts. Younger cohorts and male workers fare better
in subsequent service sector jobs compared to older cohorts and female workers respectively.
These results point to the importance of short-run adjustment costs of globalization and inform
policy makers about the most vulnerable.
There is a valuable literature that uses a structural approach to workers adjustment to trade
shocks. Some studies using a structural empirical model are aimed at recovering trade ad-
justment costs that workers face (e.g. Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010), Dix-Carneiro
(2014)) and others at analyzing the relationship between trade and wage inequality in the
presence of search frictions (e.g. Helpman, Itshoki, Muendler and Redding (2014)). This pa-
per’s findings also inform structural studies empirically on modeling workers’ adjustment. In
particular, they suggest that adjustment costs substantially differ across workers with different
characteristics.
This paper is organized as follows. Data used in this study are described in the next section.
Background information on the MFA quotas and Danish labor market institutions is provided
in section 3, followed by a description of the empirical strategy in section 4. Results are
presented and discussed in section 5 followed by concluding remarks in section 6.
2 Data
The main database used in this study is the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research,
IDA, which is comprised of person, establishment, and job files. The person files contain annual
information on all persons of age 15-70 residing in Denmark with a social security number. The
establishment files contain annual information on all establishments with at least one employee
in the last week of November in each year. The job files provide information on all jobs that
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are active in the last week of November in each year. IDA data-sets are complemented with
the domestic production data-set (VARES) that covers all manufacturing firms with at least
10 employees, and the annual longitudinal data-set that matches firms with their employees
(FIDA). The sample period of constructed data-sets is 1999-2010. The data-sets are from
Statistics Denmark (Danmarks Statistik).
For each worker I observe, among others, annual and hourly salary for their primary em-
ployment, industry code for the primary employment, the occupational status in the primary
employment, education level, demographic characteristics such as age, gender and family sta-
tus, and total salaries obtained from all jobs held within a year. The domestic production
data-set (VARES) is used to identify firms with domestic production in one or more of the
goods that were subject to the MFA quotas. Through FIDA, the firm identification numbers
are mapped with worker-level information.
In contrast to the U.S. data used by Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014), the IDA database
provides information on hours worked as well as detailed occupation and education levels
of employees. This facilitates additional and more detailed analyses of workers’ adjustment.
Matched employer-employee data from developing countries, such as the one from Brazil used
in Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), provide information only on workers who are (formally)
employed. So no information is provided for workers if they are informally employed, unem-
ployed, self-employed, or just outside the labor market. In contrast to these data-sets, the IDA
database contains information on every person regardless of their labor market status as long as
they are between 15 and 70 years old. Tables A-1 and A-3 present sample information from the
1999-cross section of workers’ demographic, education and occupation characteristics. Table
A-4 presents sample information from the 1999-cross section of workplace characteristics. The
fact that the IDA database provides information on everybody in the labor market instead of,
for example, surveying a random sample or ‘formal employees’ allows me to conduct a detailed
study that utilizes a policy change for a single industry.
Quota information is reported in the Syste`me Inte´gre´ de Gestion de Licenses (SIGL) database
which is constructed by the European Commission and is publicly available. The SIGL manages
licences for imports of textiles, clothing, footwear and steel to the EU. The textile and clothing
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license database is classified according to 163 grouped quota categories defined by the EU.
These categories are mapped to CN 8 digit products based on Combined Nomenclature 1999.5
3 Background Information
3.1 MFA Quotas
Due to its political sensitivity as a traditionally labor intensive industry, world trade in T&C
was excluded from the agreement when GATT was signed in 1948 and continued to be governed
by bilateral agreements. As the number of agreements grew, the Multi-fibre Arrangement was
introduced in 1974 to govern the world trade in T&C. Denmark is a member of the EU (formerly
the European Community) since 1973 and most MFA quotas were negotiated for the EU as
a whole. Starting 1993 the quotas have also been managed at the EU level, harmonizing any
member state specific differences.
In 1995 the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) replaced the MFA, and provisions were
made for phasing it out in four steps over a period of 10 years. Quotas were to be eliminated
equivalent to 16 percent of 1990 imports at the beginning of 1995, 17 percent at the beginning
of 1998, 18 percent at the beginning of 2002, and the remaining 49 percent at the beginning of
2005. By being outside of the WTO during the 1990s, China did not benefit from the first two
phases of quota abolishment. One of the immediate concrete changes that WTO membership
brought to China was dismantling of the first three phases of MFA quotas on China in January
2002 and allowing it to benefit from the scheduled last phase in January 2005.6
5Annex I of the “Council Regulation (EEC) No 3030/93 of 12 October 1993 on common rules for imports
of certain textile products from third countries” is used as a main reference for the concordance between quota
categories and the CN 8-digit products. The annex is available at the SIGL. The same mapping is also used in
Utar (forthcoming) with a difference that quotas for China that were extended until the beginning of 2008 are
also included in this study. See footnote 6.
6Due to an excessive surge of Chinese imports in the first few months of 2005 at the EU ports in response
to the final phase of the quota removal, the EU retained a few of the quota categories until 2008. This event is
popularly referred to and publicized as the “Bra War”. Since the sample period extends over 2008, those few
quotas are also included in the current analysis.
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Under ATC the selection of MFA products to be integrated into the normal WTO system
was left to the importing countries/legislatures and the EU started its phasing out processes
by integrating mainly products or MFA categories with no quotas vis-a`-vis WTO members.
During the first two phases, the EU integrated 34 MFA categories, but removed only a few
existing quotas vis-a`-vis WTO members (OETH, (2000)). For example, among the major
exporting countries facing MFA quotas neither India nor Indonesia had any quotas removed
in Phase I or II.7 No quota imposed on imports from Pakistan was removed under Phase II.
Only one quota category regulating imports from Pakistan was removed in Phase I, and it had
a 0 percent utilization.
In 1998, China’s share of T&C import in Denmark was a little over 10 % compared to 2.8 %,
0.7 % and 1.3 % respectively for India, Pakistan and Indonesia. By 2010 China’s share reached
32 %, while the respective shares of India, Pakistan and Indonesia were 7 %, 1 %, and 0.3 %.
3.2 Labor Market
Denmark is among the most liberal countries in terms of firing regulations, as firms are not
burdened by monetary compensation when firing. In case of lay-offs firms are not required to
give advance notification to workers paid on an hourly basis regardless of their tenure. In the
Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 Denmark is one of a few countries in the world with
an estimate of redundancy/firing costs of zero. Provided that the maximum working hours
are respected, there are no restrictions regarding weekend or night work.8 This high level
of flexibility of firing and hiring practices is combined with a high level of publicly provided
social protection. The system is generally referred as a ’flexicurity’ system. In 2006 the Danish
employment rate was 77.4 percent (highest among the EU), and the unemployment rate was
3.9 percent (Madsen (2008)).
7For Indonesia all active quotas imposed were subject to Phase IV removal except 2 quotas (category 21
and category 33) which were subject to Phase III and were removed in 2002. Also for India there were only 2
quota categories that were subject to Phase III removal in 2002 (category 24 and category 27). The remaining
15 categories for India were removed in 2005.
8Denmark follows the same general rules laid out by the EU with a 48 hour maximum working week and a
minimum daily rest period of 11 hours.
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The social protection that workers enjoy is managed by two parallel administrative systems;
one governs active labor market policies (ALMP) and provides unemployment benefits and the
other governs active social policies and provides welfare (and unemployment) benefits. The
first system is a membership based, voluntary system. If one is a member of the first system
(the unemployment insurance fund) then s/he will get generous unemployment benefits when
unemployed and is also subject to active labor market programs. Around 80 percent of the
labor force is a member of this system (Kluve et al. 2007). Workers who are not part of
the unemployment insurance fund receive welfare benefits for as long as they are unemployed.
Denmark has a very comprehensive and large scale ALMP which started in the late 1970s and
underwent a major reform in 1994. Workers who are part of the unemployment insurance fund
have obligations to participate in ALMP offers in order to keep their eligibility status. In 2008
the long term unemployment rate (in total unemployment) was 13.5 % in Denmark, compared
to, for example 52.5 and 10.6 % for Germany and the US respectively (OECD Employment
Database 2013).
Another characteristic of the Danish labor market is the high union density. The union density
rate, which is defined as the number of union members as a ratio of all wage and salary earn-
ers in Denmark was 72 % in 2004 as reported by the ICTWSS Database, Version 4 (Visser,
2013). While there is no minimum wage requirement in Denmark, wages are determined by
collective wage bargaining agreements to a great extent. The coverage of collective wage bar-
gaining agreements over all wage and salary earners in Denmark were 85 % in 2004. (ICTWSS
Database, Version 4 (Visser, 2013))
4 Empirical Strategy
Removal of MFA quotas for China depended on whether and when it would join the WTO.
To derive a causal relationship between trade shocks and workers’ outcomes, I exploit the
exogenous trade shock due to China’s accession to the WTO which drove the removal of the
MFA quotas. Utar (forthcoming) shows that the MFA quotas were binding for China and
both the 2002 and the 2005 abolishments cause a very significant surge of MFA goods from
China in Denmark with associated decline in unit prices of these goods. Utar (forthcoming)
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also shows that removal of these quotas cause a substantial decline in employment at Danish
firms producing MFA goods. Following Utar (forthcoming) but focusing only on the firms
that produce these goods domestically, I identify workers that were employed in MFA-good
producing firms in 1999, before the WTO accession of China. I start with measuring differential
outcomes on labor earnings, income, employment, and unemployment among these workers in
comparison to other textile and clothing workers. I start with a simple difference in difference
analysis as follows:
lnXit = α0 + α1AffWi,99 ∗Dum02t + δi + τt + it (1)
where Dum02t = 1 when year > 2002 and 0 otherwise. X is the worker-level outcome. The
treatment variable AffWi,99 is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if worker i is employed
in 1999 in a firm that domestically produces a product that is subject to the abolishment of
the MFA quotas for China in 2002 or in 2005. The treatment variable is interacted with the
WTO time dummy, Dum02t, to capture the differential effect on affected workers, employed at
firms exposed to increased competition with China due to the MFA quota removals, compared
to other T&C workers, employed at firms that were not exposed to increased competition due
to the MFA quota removals.9 The aggregate trends in the industry or in the labor market are
controlled for by using year fixed effects, τt. It is possible that workers that were employed
by the exposed firms are systematically different than the rest of the T&C workers or that
the exposed firms were systematically different compared to other T&C firms. All of time-
unvarying differences across workers such as gender, occupation, education, initial wage, initial
age, including characteristics of their initial workplaces are controlled for by worker fixed effects,
δi. The coefficient estimates for α1 will measure the impact of trade shock on workers’ outcomes
due to the textile quota abolishments starting with China’s entry to the WTO in 2002.
9Utar (forthcoming) documents a significant overlap between firms that were affected by the two quota
removals for China in 2002 and 2005. The majority, 87 percent, of the firms that produced goods subject to
2002 quota removal (Phase I-II-III) were also producing goods subject to 2005 quota removal (Phase IV). Due to
the significant overlap among producers of the 2002 and the 2005 quota goods as well as the lack of uncertainty
regarding the timing of Phase IV after China’s membership of the WTO, it is not possible to identify the impact
of the 2002 and 2005 steps of the quota abolishment separately from each other.
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Note that the biggest challenge for the studies that rely on industry-wide import measures to
identify the impact of trade with China is that industries that are subject to greater import
competition may be exposed to other shocks that can be correlated with trade with China.
The empirical strategy here is free from this potentially important problem because I focus
on a single industry and utilize across firm differences in exposure to trade with China due
to an exogenous policy change. The other factors including technology shocks and the secular
declining trend in the industry are conditioned out by focusing on the differential outcomes
of T&C employees employed by the exposed firms compared to other T&C employees after
controlling for aggregate shocks and worker fixed effects. These estimates on the other hand can
be viewed as a lower bound of the low-wage competition impact because they are conditioned
out of the general declining trend of T&C industry even if this is partly caused by trade factors.
Utar (forthcoming) shows that the MFA quota removal for China leads to a significant decline
in employment in firms producing MFA goods. These displaced workers are likely the ones
who experience disproportionate decline in their earnings. But they are also expected to move
to other jobs, and subsequently partially or fully compensate for their initial loss. The impact
that is captured by α1 is an average impact over the 9 years period. In order to disentangle
the impact across different jobs that workers hold subsequently, as well as to get comparable
results to the ones reported for the US economy by Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2013), I
also use their baseline regression in my context:
X˜iT = β0 + β1AffWi,99 + Z
W
i,99 + Z
F
i,99 + iT (2)
where
X˜iT =
T=2010∑
t=2002
Xit
X¯it0
is the cumulative outcome variable, say wage earnings, over 2002 to 2010, normalized by
the average annual outcome over 1999-2000 for worker i employed in the textile and clothing
industry as his/her primary employment in 1999.
The vector ZW contains worker controls: age quartiles, gender, immigration status, occupation
categories of the worker in 1999, the education level of the worker in 1999, the logarithm of the
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average hourly wage for 1999-2000, and the unemployment history of the worker since 1980
until 1999.10 The vector ZF contains controls for the T&C workplace of the worker in 1999:
the logarithm of the average hourly wage paid in the workplace in 1999, and the separation rate
in 1999 as measured by the percentage of employees that are not employed in the workplace
one year to another.
The cumulative outcome embeds the sum of shocks over the periods of abolishment and after-
wards. I normalized it by workers’ pre-MFA quota abolishment outcome, X¯it0 .
11 The estimates
of β1 will capture the cumulative impact of the low-wage import shock due to removal of the
MFA quotas over the 9 year period among workers, all of whom were employed by T&C man-
ufacturing firms and have similar demographic-occupational-educational background, wage,
unemployment history, and workplace characteristics before the quota abolishment period.
5 Results
5.1 The Impact of Trade Shock on Workers’ Future Earnings and Employ-
ment
5.1.1 Average Effects
Table 1 presents results from estimating equation 1 for income and employment measures. The
sample consists of all employees of the textile and clothing sector in 1999 if the employment
relationship is considered as primary (instead of secondary or other types of side jobs) from
the perspective of the employee as recorded in November.
The results show that T&C workers that were under direct threat from the MFA removals
experienced a significant disproportionate decline in their annual labor income compared to
10Occupation categories are top-level and executive positions, intermediate-level occupations, base-level occu-
pations and the outside category which consists of workers with auxiliary occupations or workers with unspecified
occupations. Education controls are dummy variables for workers with at least some college education, workers
with vocational education and workers with at most a high school degree.
11To minimize measurement errors, I normalized it using the 1999-2000 average of the relevant outcome
variable.
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other T&C workers. The coefficient estimate in Panel A indicates an about 6.5 % decline in
annual salary from the primary employment. In Panel B total labor income, which is defined
as the summation of all wages earned from all occupations held within a year, is considered.
The impact is only a bit less, it is about 5.9 % and significant at the 1 percent. Note that
identification of workers that were exposed to the low-wage import competition is based on
their primary employment. So even if workers work for their initial employers throughout
the sample period, other side jobs held by the worker are not necessarily in a competition-
exposed company or even in the same sector. Hence the impact on total wages is expected
to be smaller. The salary information is typically reported by the employer. As a robustness
check, I also used total salary information which is directly reported by the person to the
tax authorities. The D-D coefficient estimate as presented in panel C of Table 1 is quite
similar, revealing an about 5.7 % decline. The last income measure considered is the personal
income that includes labor income as well as income from self-employment, pension income,
government transfers, and other cash benefits excluding wealth/capital income. Unemployed
workers receive compensating benefits from their unions and from the government. Part of
the adjustment could also involve working as a self-employed, or going into early retirement.
The results for annual personal income shows an about 2.3 % decline and indicates that these
potentially compensating benefits still do not fully cover the loss in annual labor earnings that
was caused by the MFA trade shock.12
12While the number of observations vary due to availabilities of the variables, when income measures are run
on a sample where all other income variables are available, the respective coefficient from Panel A through Panel
D are: −0.069∗∗∗, −0.049∗∗∗, −0.047∗∗∗, and −0.030∗∗∗. In these results (as opposed to the ones presented in
Table 1) the sample includes workers as long as they have a primary occupation in November, since otherwise
salary information is missing. So workers who are recipients of unemployment insurance or pension benefits are
not included in the personal income result (−0.030∗∗∗).
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Table 1: Fixed Effects: Impact of MFA Quota Abolishment on Earnings, and Employment 2002-2010
Sample: All Workers with primary occupation in T&C sector in 1999
AffW (α̂1)
A Annual Salary (primary employment) -0.067***
(0.011)
B Total Salaries from all occupations held within a year -0.061***
(0.012)
C Total Salaries from all occupations held within a year- personal tax records -0.059***
(0.012)
D Personal Income including unemployment insurance and other government transfers -0.023**
(0.008)
E Total Annual Hours Worked (primary employment) -0.045***
(0.007)
F Total Annual Hours Worked (all occupations) -0.089***
(0.015)
G Hourly Wage (primary employment) 0.006
(0.004)
H Hourly Wage (avg. across all occupations) 0.005
(0.005)
I Average No of Days Worked Across All Occupations Within a Year -0.051***
(0.010)
J Cumulative Unemployment Measure 0.098***
(0.012)
Notes: All regressions include year and person fixed effects. All dependent variables are in logarithmic form. A constant is included but not reported.
Due to differences in data sources, and availabilities the number of observations vary. However, to make the magnitude comparisons meaningful, total
salary variables obtained from different sources are ran on a common sample. Regression results for personal income only include workers within the
labor force. The number of observations from Panel A through Panel J are 117427, 128815, 128815, 147223, 111613, 73497, 111613, 73497, 73467, and
121159 respectively. Data Source: Statistics Denmark.
The negative effect of the MFA shock in labor earnings could be a result of decline in hourly
wages as well as a decline in the number of hours worked within a year. Results presented
in panel E through H in Table 1 show that the trade shock causes decline in labor earnings
through decline in the number of hours worked instead of through hourly wages. Results in
Panel I and J show that workers also experience a significant decline in the average number
of days employed within a year13 and the reduction in the number of days worked is not just
something voluntary as the significant increase in the unemployment rate shows. On average
13While most of the workers have one occupation per year, if a worker works in more than one occupation either
because (s)he changes occupation or has additional jobs, this measure shows the average across all occupations.
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the import shock caused by dismantling of MFA quotas for China associated with China’s
WTO accession is found to cause a significant increase in unemployment among Danish T&C
workers that were employed at affected firms. These observations invite a closer look at the
types of adjustment that displaced workers experienced.
Table 2 presents the estimation results for equation 1 among workers with primary occupations
in the T&C sector in 1999 separately across different educational backgrounds: among workers
with college education, among workers with skill/vocational education and among workers
with at most a (non-technical) high school degree. The results reveal that the impact of the
negative shock is not homogeneous across workers with different educational backgrounds. The
negative effect is concentrated among workers with lower level of education. The impact of the
MFA shock on future earnings among workers with at most a high school diploma is negative
and significant. For these workers the results show an about 8.8 % disproportionate decline
in primary annual salary and total annual salaries. Even if one considers self-employment as
well as unemployment and other government transfers, the impact on income of workers with
lower level of education is found to be negative and significant by about 4.3 %. The results on
annual hours worked and unemployment reveal that the declines in earnings are due to decline
in employment.
The impact of the MFA shock on future employment among workers with vocational training is
also found to be very substantial. This group of workers contain high-skilled textile operators,
clothing, knitting operators, tailors, etc..Note also that these magnitudes are relative to other
textile workers with the same educational backgrounds, hence the impact found here can be
considered as a lower bound of the real impact that these workers experience in an industry in
decline in Denmark.
The impact of the low-wage import shock on the other hand is not found to be significant on
college educated T&C workers. This could be either because college educated T&C workers
were not affected significantly at their competition exposed workplaces or because they recov-
ered from the shock fast enough that the average annual effect throughout the 9 year period
becomes insignificant. This is be analyzed below.
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5.1.2 Cumulative Effect
Table 3 presents estimation results of equation 2 for workers’ cumulative earnings, cumulative
employment and earnings per year of employment among workers with their primary occu-
pation within the T&C sector in 1999. Column (a) presents the results with no worker and
workplace controls and shows negative and significant effect on workers’ cumulative earnings
measured in initial annual wage. The effect amounts to a little over 72 % of a pre-MFA abol-
ishment annual wage. Results in column (a) of Panel B show no significant relationship with
the cumulative employment measure which is the number of years with positive labor earnings.
Results in Panel C of column (a) show a negative and significant effect of the trade shock on
workers’ annual earnings per year of employment.
Workers exposed to the trade shock may be systematically different from other textile workers.
After controlling for workers’ demographic, occupational, educational differences as well as their
past performance (unemployment history, initial wage), and initial workplace characteristics
that may have an affect on workers’ accumulation of knowledge and experience, coefficients
of earnings are significant at the 1 percent level and the coefficient estimate of cumulative
employment stay insignificant. Confirming the results obtained with the fixed effects model,
these results show that textile workers that were under direct threat from the MFA removals
experienced a significant disproportionate decline in their cumulative income compared to other
textile workers with the same demographic-occupational-educational-workplace characteristics.
Table 4 presents the results of the same exercise run on a restricted sample that only includes
workers with a continuous tenure of a more than a year of full-time occupation at the initial
workplace. Results are similar but slightly lower in magnitudes indicating that workers with
less stable positions at the initial workplace are affected more negatively by the trade shock.
This could be because the group of workers with less stable positions in the T&C sector are
more likely to be lower skilled workers. Hence their adjustment to the initial trade shock could
be more painful. Note also that even if the main sample includes workers regardless of whether
their employment in the T&C sector is full-time or not, the employment in the T&C sector is
still their primary attachment to the labor market.
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Fixed effects results show that the main channel for the import shock’s effect on labor earnings
was declining hours worked rather than decline in hourly wages. In addition to the results for
cumulative earnings, cumulative employment and earnings per year of employment, column
(a) of Table 5 also shows results from the estimation of equation 2 for the dependent variables
cumulative hours worked, hours worked per year of employment and hourly rate per year of
employment.
While the coefficient estimate for the cumulative employment measure, which is a crude em-
ployment measure that shows the number of years with positive earnings,14 does not show any
significance (column a of Panel B), the impact on cumulative earnings (column a of Panel A)
is negative and significant by about 70 % of an annual salary. These results are similar to the
results obtained in Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2013) for American workers. Autor, Dorn,
Hanson and Song (2013) interpret the finding of significant decline in earnings per year with
no corresponding decline in the cumulative employment measure as support for the hypothesis
that earnings decline via decline in wages instead of employment.
Column (a) of Panel D in Table 5 shows that most of the declines observed in the cumulative
earnings of Danish workers are actually due to decline in the cumulative number of hours
worked.15 Results obtained for hours worked per year of employment as well as hourly rate
per year of employment as shown in column (a) of Panels E and F reveal that the significant
negative effect on the average labor earnings is mainly due to a decline in the number of
hours worked within a year, confirming the results obtained with the fixed effect model.16
These results are in line with the general structure of the Danish labor market where collective
bargaining of wages causes downwardly inflexible wages.
14Note that since the corresponding earnings measure is annual earnings from a worker’s primary employment
as recorded in November, both the cumulative employment and the earnings per year of employment measures
are based on the primary employment as recorded in November.
15The cumulative hours and the hourly rate measures are also based on the primary employment as recorded
in November.
16It is important to note that information on the number of hours worked and hourly wages is not available
for all workers with information on annual salaries, but the strong and robust results obtained across different
specifications indicate that the decline in hours worked per year is the main explanation for the decline in per
year earnings.
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5.2 Workers’ Movement Within and Across Sectors
Affected workers are identified by the competition that their initial employers are exposed
to. So the impact on the cumulative outcomes contain potentially offsetting effects due to
workers’ adjustment to the shock by moving across occupations, workplaces, or industries. To
analyze the impact of the MFA abolishment on workers’ movement, the cumulative measures
are decomposed into a set of additive and mutually exclusive channels of adjustment: impact at
their initial employers, at other employers in the T&C sector, at other manufacturing sectors,
at the service sector and all other sectors which includes agriculture, fishing, etc. These results
are presented in columns (b) through (f) in Table 5.
Results in Panel A of Table 5 show that a substantial negative effect on earnings was expe-
rienced at the initial employer amounting to 95 % of an initial annual salary. This loss was
partially compensated for, such that the overall impact is 69.5 % of an initial annual salary,
by workers’ movement to service sector jobs and to a small extent also by movement within
the sector, although none of these coefficients are found to be significant. Similarly, coefficient
estimates in panel B of Table 5 show that the MFA removal caused a significant loss of em-
ployment of workers at their initial (affected) employers. Positive and significant coefficients
of columns (c) and (e) in Panel B also indicate that affected workers offset their employment
loss at the initial firm by moving across jobs within T&C, and to a larger extent by moving to
service sector jobs.
Coefficient estimates in Panel C indicate that workers that were exposed to the competition
via their initial employers had a significant reduction in their earnings per year not only at
their initial employer but also at the service sector jobs that they subsequently moved to. The
decline in per year earnings is 2.1 % at the exposed firm but it is 14 % at subsequent service
sector jobs. This could be either because they earn less per hour or they work less, maybe
because they only find part-time jobs in the service sector. The results presented in Panel D
and Panel E of Table 5 confirm that employment has shortened significantly at the initial firm.
Column (e) of Panels B, D and E also show that affected workers are more likely to switch to
service jobs but they are also more likely to spend less hours in these jobs. More specifically,
the MFA shock causes an increase in cumulative hours worked in service sector jobs by about
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32 % of pre-abolishment annual hours worked. At the same time, affected workers work 13
% less hours per year in these service sector jobs. Together with the results presented in
Panel F on the impact on the hourly wage per year of employment (normalized by the initial
hourly wage), they imply that the decline in average earnings observed in the service sector is
not because that affected workers find less well-paid (per hour) service sector jobs or because
affected workers experience subsequent reductions in their hourly rates, but because they work
less. Affected workers may have difficulty in finding full-time service sector occupations or
occupations that are suitable to them, and hence they have a higher likelihood of leaving or
losing the employment within a year.
Table 6 presents the same exercise conducted for full-time workers with more than one year
continuous tenure in the initial T&C workplace in 1999. These results show that workers with
more stable positions in the exposed firms had experienced somewhat bigger reductions in
their cumulative earnings in the initial workplace, amounting to a little more than one full
annual salary. But these workers did better at partially compensating subsequently in service
sector jobs. In the service sector they recover close to 70 % of a pre-abolishment annual wage.
These findings confirm the above interpretation of Table 4 results that the trade shock had a
stronger effect on workers with relatively less stable or part-time initial employment because of
the more painful adjustment process that these workers experienced. Autor, Dorn, Hanson and
Song (2014) also find that low tenure American workers did worse than high tenure workers
in adjusting to the low-wage import shock. The results that the initial negative shock was felt
stronger for workers with more stable positions are in line with the general structure of the
Danish labor market with very liberal rules for firing as well as with the idea that workers with
more stable positions are the ones most likely to have accumulated substantial firm-specific
human capital.
The cumulative earnings variable is calculated using the workers’ primary employment in
November. An alternative definition of the cumulative outcome variables can be based on all
occupations, including part-time and side jobs held by workers within a year. Corresponding
results that are based on all occupations held by a worker within a year are presented in Table
B-1.17 Table B-2 presents the results with the alternative outcome variables on the restricted
17The hourly rate variable that is based on all occupations is a simple average across all occupations held
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sample that only includes workers with a continuous tenure of a more than a year of full-time
occupation at the T&C industry in 1999. The results are robust.
5.2.1 Dynamics of Workers’ Adjustment
In order to see the cumulative impact over time, equation 2 is estimated separately for each
year from 2002. In these regressions the cumulative outcome variable is the cumulative sum
of the outcome variable from 2002 until the year of the regression normalized by the initial
value of the respective outcome variable. Figure 1-(a) shows the coefficient estimates (β̂1)
and the confidence interval from the year by year regressions of cumulative earnings. The
negative impact on earnings in 2002 is found to be significant. The first phase of the quota
abolishment for China was in January 2002 which covered the first three phases of MFA quotas.
Workers’ outcome variables such as the earnings or hours worked at the primary employment
are recorded at the end of the year. So the impact measured in 2002 measures the impact for
the whole year in 2002.
Figure 1-(b) shows the coefficient estimates from the decomposition exercise of the cumulative
earnings effect. The negative impact at the initial workplace increases in an increasing rate
from 2002 until 2005. After that the rate of increase decreases a bit. Evolution of the impact
across sectors also reveals that initially workers are able to partially compensate for their loss
by switching to other jobs within the same sector. However the contribution of the T&C
sector decreases through time especially after 2005. In 2008, the positive cumulative earnings
impact at other T&C jobs reaches 0.1 (in initial annual earnings) but the cumulative impact
decreases and becomes insignificant in the following years. On the other hand workers are able
to compensate better by moving to service sector jobs, especially after 2005. Throughout the
period 2002-2010 non T&C manufacturing jobs are not found to be a very important source
of earnings compensation.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the coefficient estimates (β̂1) from the year by year regressions of
the cumulative employment (the number of years with positive salary from workers’ primary
employment) and the cumulative hours worked in workers’ primary employment normalized
within a year.
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by the annual hours worked in the initial primary employment.
The impact of the Chinese import shock is found to be negative and significant on cumulative
employment until 2005. After that employment improves gradually. Figure 2-(b) reveals that
improvement in employment coincides with increased employment in the service sector. Laid-
off workers probably first look for jobs within their own sector in order to utilize their sector
or occupation specific human capital, but as the industry is shrinking they take employment
in the service sector. Figure 3 shows that the decline in the cumulative hours worked flattened
a bit after 2005, but it still continued to decrease afterwards. Workers’ shorter employment
spells or shorter hours in service jobs probably contributed to this.
Figure 4 shows the coefficient estimates from year by year regressions of cumulative income
since 1999. Results show that whether a worker was employed by a MFA producer or not did
not matter in 1999 or in 2000. In 2001 there is a slight decline in the cumulative income, which
may be contributed by voluntary separations. Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014) find
that high wage workers are more likely to separate from their employers prior to mass layoffs.
Note also that China’s WTO membership was approved by the WTO Ministerial Conference
on November 10 2001 and the worker variables in the IDA database are recorded at the end
of November of each year.
5.3 Heterogeneity in Workers’ Adjustment
5.3.1 Education
Are all trade exposed workers affected equally at their initial employer? Do they have the
same chance of moving between jobs, and compensating for their initial loss subsequently in
service sector jobs? Results in the previous section show that on average college educated
workers were not significantly affected by the negative trade shock caused by the removal of
the MFA quotas. But these results only reveal the average across the 9 year period. It is
possible that while college educated workers are in fact influenced by the trade shock, they
have fully recovered through subsequent adjustment by the end of the period.
In this section I use the same decomposition exercise conducted in Table 5 separately for college
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educated, for workers with vocational education and for workers with at most a (non-technical)
high school degree. The results are presented in Table 7 and in Table 8. These results show that
college educated workers were at least as heavily hit as workers with lower level of education at
the initial employer. The difference between workers with different education levels stemmed
from their ability to compensate for the initial loss, incurred due to the low-wage import shock.
While all affected workers regardless of their education have higher likelihood of switching to
service sector jobs (column (e) of Panel B in Table 7), affected workers with vocational training
and affected workers with at most a high school degree are not able to compensate for their
earnings loss significantly in the service sector. College educated workers, on the other hand,
are able to fully compensate for the earning loss (comparing coefficients in columns (b) and
(e) at the first row of Panel A) in service sector jobs. This could be because college educated
workers are able to find better paid jobs compared to workers with lower level of education.
Results in Panel C of Table 7 show that affected workers with at most a high school degree
have significantly lower earnings per year subsequently in the service sector jobs, by about 20
% of an initial annual wage.
Results on cumulative employment also indicate that affected unskilled workers (workers with
at most a high school diploma) not only have difficulty in getting good jobs in the service sector
but their future employment opportunities within the T&C sector are also worse relative to
affected workers with college and vocational education. Results in Panel B of Table 7 show that
affected workers with both college and vocational education have higher likelihood of switching
to other jobs within the T&C sector but this is not the case for affected workers with at most
a high school degree. Results on hourly rates in Panel C of Table 8 show that affected workers
with college education receive even higher hourly wages on average in these T&C jobs. Part
of the move to other T&C jobs could be thought to be voluntary or self-initiated for college
educated workers. These results are in line with Utar (forthcoming) that shows that the removal
of MFA quotas triggered restructuring concentrated among MFA importer-producers. These
firms increased their ratio of college educated workforce, and the restructuring was associated
with increase in wages to college educated workers. Such firms have likely already offshored
the domestic production (of MFA protected goods) before the removal of quotas. Employees of
exposed firms who were able to switch to importer-producer firms, were probably better able
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to utilize their already accumulated industry-occupation specific knowledge.18
Panel A of Table 8 shows that for college educated affected workers the increase relative to
other college educated T&C workers in the cumulative hours worked in service sector jobs is
about 88 % of pre-MFA annual hours worked compared to 31 % and 23 % relative increases
for vocational and high school educated affected workers respectively.
Results for hours worked per year of employment presented in Panel B of Table 8 reveal an
about 16 % decline in the annual hours worked in the subsequent service sector occupations
for affected workers with at most a high school degree.
The results suggest that affected workers with lower level of education face worse future em-
ployment opportunities within the T&C sector compared to affected workers with college ed-
ucation. Aggravating their condition, these results indicate that affected workers with lower
level of education have a harder time finding ’good’ jobs in the service sector compared to
their college educated colleagues. Results suggest that jobs that affected workers with lower
education find in the service sector are generally part-time or short-term jobs or that they are
not as well matched with these jobs and so have a higher likelihood of leaving or losing these
jobs.
In recent decades an increase in the employment share of both the top and the lowest skill-
level occupations is observed in advanced countries together with a decline in employment
in middle-skill level occupations that typically cover many manufacturing functions (Goos,
Manning, and Salomons (2009), Autor and Dorn (2013)). The results here imply that a low-
wage trade shock to manufacturing sectors and subsequent movement of manufacturing workers
to service sector occupations could play an important role in the job polarization observed in
advanced countries.
18These results are also in line with Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch and Xiang (2014) who show that offshoring
is associated with an increased wage premium for high-skilled workers in Denmark.
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5.3.2 Occupation
Table 9 and Table 10 present the decomposition analysis separately for workers with different
occupations.19 Results presented in Panel A of Table 9 show that over the 2002-2010 period
unskilled workers who were exposed to the shock experienced a decline in their cumulative
earnings that is close to two annual salaries (in initial salary) relative to other unskilled T&C
workers with similar characteristics. Affected machine operators experienced a decline in their
cumulative earnings relative to other T&C machine operators that amounts to about one
annual salary. The impact on the cumulative earnings over the 2002-2010 period for managers,
workers with professional and technical occupations, clerks and other service workers as well as
handcraft workers, on the other hand, is not found to be statistically significant. These results
reveal significant heterogeneity of the impact of the low-wage import shock across workers with
different occupations.
The extent of the negative shock experienced by unskilled workers and machine operators at
their initial exposed workplaces were similar, between 90 to 100 % of a pre-MFA abolishment
annual salary. Machine operators consists of workers with occupations such as textile operator,
knitting or clothing operator. These occupations were hit hard by the removal of the MFA
quotas for China as shown in Utar (forthcoming). Panel B of Table 10 shows that exposed
machine operators had a higher likelihood of moving on to other manufacturing jobs as well as
to service sector jobs. One expects that all of their occupation-specific knowledge would become
obsolete in service jobs. On the other hand, they may partially utilize their initial occupation-
specific information in other manufacturing jobs. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) show that
human capital is specific to the occupation in which an individual works and that occupational
experience plays an important role in determining wages. Results on cumulative earnings
support this idea. Although not statistically significant, machine operators that move to other
manufacturing jobs were somewhat able to compensate for their earning loss by about 20 %
of a pre-MFA abolishment annual wage, but subsequent movement to the service sector has a
negative effect on the cumulative earnings. Unskilled workers fare even worse and experience
19Occupation classifications follow International Standard Occupational Classification (ISCO-88) major
groupings.
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an additional decline in earnings in subsequent jobs of close to one initial annual wage.
Due to the large number of occupation-specific categories, I omitted the analyses for earnings
and hours per year of employment, but comparing the estimates for cumulative outcomes on
employment, earnings and hours will still provide insight into these outcomes. The ratio of the
coefficient estimates of cumulative employment to cumulative earnings indicates that earnings
per year of employment decline substantially for machine operators and unskilled workers
both overall and especially at subsequent service sector jobs. Results on the cumulative hours
presented in Table 10 also suggest that the main margin for the decline in earnings per year is
the decline in the number of hours worked.
Piore and Sabel (1984) argues that low-wage competition forces restructuring of manufacturing
towards more customized, craft oriented products while relocating mass production to low-wage
countries. Utar (forthcoming) documented restructuring in line with this idea in the Danish
textile and clothing industry in response to the intensified competition from China. Results
presented in Table 9 and Table 10 show that handcraft workers were the least negatively
affected group at their exposed workplaces compared to other occupations. The impact on
cumulative earnings at the initial workplace is found to be 62 % of a pre-MFA abolishment
annual wage and the result is only weakly significant. Craft workers have also been relatively
good at compensating for the initial loss subsequently at service sector jobs. This group of
workers includes craftsmen, like tailors, so one expects that they had a relatively better skill-
match subsequently in jobs in the service sector.
While craft workers are the least affected occupational group at the initial workplace, clerks
and other service workers suffered the smallest impact on their cumulative earnings and em-
ployment overall over the 9 years. They had been affected at the initial workplace as badly as
machine operators in terms of cumulative earnings or as badly as unskilled workers in terms
of cumulative employment and hours worked, yet their abilities to recover subsequently were
very good. This is most probably because the occupation specific human capital of this group
requires the least industry specific knowledge, for example compared to being a machine op-
erator in the T&C sector or being a textile engineer. These findings highlight the importance
of heterogeneity in adjustment costs across workers with different occupations. Note also that
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we are focusing on differences across occupations controlling for other worker characteristics
including education levels or age categories.
5.3.3 Age
Tables 11-12 present the impact of the low-wage import shock due to removal of MFA quotas on
cumulative earnings and employment across different age groups and decomposes the impact
across a set of mutually exclusive jobs and sectors. Here the early career group consists of
workers who in 1999 were between 22 and 35 years old. The mid career group is defined as
workers who in 1999 were between 36 and 49 years old and finally the late career group consists
of workers who in 1999 were 50 years old or older.20
Results in Panel A of Table 11 show that the Chinese import causes cumulative earnings of
late-career (50+) workers to decrease significantly by about 86 % of a pre-MFA abolishment
annual salary. For mid-career workers (36-49) the impact is 60 % and the cumulative earnings
for the younger cohort (22-35) are not found to be affected significantly. Overall effects contain
differences in the ability to adjust to the initial shock by age cohorts. Results presented in
column b of Panel A in Table 11 show that the impact on the cumulative earnings at the MFA
shock exposed workplace was strongest for mid career workers ( 1.3 initial annual salary),
followed by early career workers ( 0.9 initial annual salary) and late career workers ( 0.8
initial annual salary) respectively. As mentioned in the previous section, Denmark is among
the most liberal countries in terms of firing regulations as firms are not burdened by the
monetary compensation or advance notifications in case of lay-offs regardless of the tenure of
the employees.21 The relatively strong initial shock on mid-career workers can be thought to
be due to a combination of firms’ lack of consideration regarding employees’ tenure when laying
off as they downsize, and the fact that mid-career workers should have been experiencing the
most stable increase in the cumulative earnings/employment at the initial workplace compared
20Workers who were younger than 22 years old (youth) in 1999 are not included in this analysis as the number
of observations were too low to make a meaningful decomposition analysis.
21In Denmark employment can be based on hourly wages which is the most typical form of employment for
production workers or on monthly or annual salaries no matter the number of hours worked. The former is
exempt from advance notification while employers are still required to give advance notifications for the latter.
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to other age groups, had there not been a negative shock.
For all age groups, the likelihood of subsequent employment in the service sector increases
due to the low-wage import shock caused by removal of the MFA quotas for China (column
e of Panel B in Table 11). For mid career workers the number of years spent in other jobs
in the same sector as well as in other manufacturing jobs increases significantly as well by
about 1/4 and 1/5 of a year respectively. In terms of earning potentials, while mid career
workers are doing relatively better in other jobs in the same sector, early career workers have
relatively better earning potentials in service sector jobs, and are able to compensate for 66 %
of (0.593/0.896) their initial earning loss in subsequent service jobs while mid and late career
workers can only compensate for 19 and 13 % of their initial losses respectively in service
jobs. These results are in line with previous findings that younger displaced workers have a
faster rate of recovery (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)). Results on cumulative hours
worked, hours worked per year of employment as well as hourly rate per year of employment
presented in Table 12 indicate that mid and late career T&C workers had a hard time getting
and keeping service jobs.
5.3.4 Gender
The T&C industry has generally had a high proportion of female workers due to the nature of
the manual labor involved (sewing, knitting, cutting, etc..). The ratio of female workers to male
workers has been decreasing significantly in Denmark, as well as in other advanced countries,
because this kind of labor-intensive occupations have been disproportionately affected by the
international production sharing (Olsen, Ibsen, and Westergaard-Nielsen (2004)). However, in
1999 the majority of workers in the Danish T&C industry were still women (Table A-1).
Tables 13 and 14 present the impact of the Chinese import shock due to removal of MFA quotas
on workers’ outcomes separately for female and male workers. The impact of the negative shock
at the exposed workplace on cumulative earnings is similar for both women and men, Panel A
of Table 13 indicates. The impacts on cumulative employment and cumulative hours worked
at the exposed workplace are found to be slightly lower for women, although the differences
are not statistically significant. Earnings per year of employment as well as hours worked
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per year of employment at the exposed workplace are found to be negative and significant
for women workers only. These results suggest that women workers may be more willing to
accept shortened hours worked at the initial workplace compared to men. When we compare
the impact at the initial workplace with the overall impact, results reveal that women were not
able to recover from the negative shock during the 9 post-MFA years, while men experienced
a faster recovery. Despite the finding that both female and male affected workers have higher
likelihood of moving to subsequent service sector jobs (column e of Panel B in Table 13), the
impact on cumulative earnings at subsequent service sector jobs is basically zero for women
while it amounts to 70 % of a pre-MFA annual wage for men. Results presented in Table 14
suggest that this is because subsequently held service sector jobs do not provide longer term
stable positions for the female workers.
5.3.5 Size of the Initial Workplace
Table 15 presents results on workers’ adjustment depending on the size of the initial employers.
For this, workers are partitioned into two groups depending on whether the total annual wages
paid by the initial employer is above or below the median level of total annual wages in the
sample in 1999. Since the average wage at the initial employer is already controlled for in these
regressions (it is part of the vector ZFi,99), this way the potential effect of the size of the initial
employer is brought into focus.
Results reveal that the initial trade shock is felt stronger if workers’ employers are larger, but
displaced workers from larger firms do better in compensating for the loss in subsequent jobs,
so the cumulative negative effect over the 9 year period is larger for workers initially employed
at small firms. If more people are laid-off in larger affected firms, then it is normal that the
initial shock is felt stronger in these firms. International trade models where firm heterogeneity
is driven by firm-specific productivity levels predict that low productivity firms (who are also
smaller) will be the first ones to be forced to exit or downsize as foreign competition intensifies
with trade liberalization. But if low-wage competition forces production of standard goods
away from advanced countries, then firms in advanced countries may shift to more specialized
products that require closer connection with upstream and downstream industries in order
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to protect themselves from ’more efficient’ mass producers. This is in line with the type of
restructuring that happened in the Danish T&C industry as documented by Utar (forthcoming)
in response to the Chinese competition. It is also in line with the findings presented in the
previous section that craft workers are relatively less affected by the import shock. Firms that
already specialized could be considered to be smaller than firms who have mass production
facilities. These firms who have bigger production facilities are more likely to be more affected
by the competition. These ideas are also modeled in recent work by Holmes and Stevens
(2010).
5.4 Moving Outside of Labor Market?
So far the analysis does not say whether the import shock caused by removal of the MFA
quotas drive workers out of the labor force. Workers can move outside of labor market for
a variety of reasons including education purposes, family/maternity/health reasons, through
prolonged unemployment, or retirement. In Denmark there is an early retirement system that
allows people to effectively be retired at the age of 60.22 It is possible that older workers who
were displaced opt for early retirement instead of going through a costly adjustment process.
To see if the low-wage import shock causes an increased incentive to move outside of the labor
market, I analyze the impact of the import shock on the number of post-WTO accession years
the person spends at a set of mutually exclusive labor market positions:23 initial employer,
other manufacturing jobs (including other T&C jobs), non-manufacturing jobs (mainly in the
service sector), self-employed, unemployed, or outside of the labor market. Results for this ex-
ercise are presented in Table 15. Results on the cumulative years spent at the initial employer,
other manufacturing jobs and non-manufacturing jobs confirm the previous findings that the
MFA shock causes workers to spend less time at the initial employer and their likelihood of
switching to other manufacturing jobs increases and to service sector jobs even more so. While
22In June 2006 the Welfare Agreement was implemented, introducing a gradual rise in the age of early
retirement by six months per year from 2019 to 2022, and a gradual rise in pension age within the ordinary
scheme by six months per year from 2024 to 2027.
23Note that these labor market positions are positions of workers at November of each year as recorded by
Statistics Denmark.
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I did not make a distinction in this analysis between service and fishing/mining/agriculture
jobs, non-manufacturing jobs are overwhelmingly service sector jobs. Results in Table 15 also
show that workers who are exposed to the low-wage import shock do not spend more time as
self-employed, but they have higher likelihood of being unemployed. A worker has an ’unem-
ployed’ labor market status in the database if s/he is unemployed in November and receives
unemployment benefit, but is still actively looking for a job. Unemployment benefit is typically
administered by the respective unions for insured workers. These workers are also subject to
ALMP offers after 12 months of unemployment. If one has a prolonged unemployment (con-
tinuously unemployed for 4 years) then this person is no longer considered within the labor
market and is not entitled to get unemployment benefit through his/her union anymore.24
Confirming the results obtained with the fixed effects model, the low-wage import shocks are
found to cause higher likelihood of being unemployed.25 Finally, results presented in Panel F
of Table 15 reveals that the MFA shock does not lead to higher likelihood of moving outside
of the labor market. This result is in contrast with what is documented for American workers
by Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2013). The active labor market policies used in Denmark
together with generous unemployment insurance may be one reason behind this difference in
outcome.
24After four years of unemployment, unemployed people are covered by social assistance benefits specifically
for unemployed people which are publicly funded and not as generous.
25Notice that the cumulative unemployment measure used in the fixed effects model is a cumulative index
measure that shows the summation of the percentage of annual working time spent as unemployed within a year
since 1980. So the unemployment measure in this analysis is stricter as a worker who was unemployed within a
year is not counted as unemployed if s/he was employed in November of a given year.
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Table 15: Labor Market Positions, 2002-2010
Sample: All Workers with primary occupation in T&C sector in 1999
Number of years AffW (β̂1)
A. at Initial Employer -0.870***
(0.056)
B. at Other Manufacturing Jobs 0.179***
(0.0524)
C. at Non-Manufacturing Jobs 0.661***
(0.057)
D. as Self-Employed -0.003
(0.004)
E. as Unemployed 0.042**
(0.016)
F. Outside of Labor Market -0.000
(0.043)
Notes: The number of observations in all panels are 11385. All regressions include a constant and the full set of controls, ZWi,99
and ZFi,99. Data Source: Statistics Denmark.
6 Concluding Remarks
Whether economic and social policies can make a difference in the distributional consequences
of globalization and cushion the impact to the most exposed groups of people is an important
part of the public debate. Particularly it has been argued that the social systems typical of
northern Europe may be better than the American counterpart at easing the burden on the
most exposed to global competition. Contributing to the debate, in this paper I analyze the
impact of Chinese competition on workers’ earnings and employment trajectories in a European
country with a generous social net and active labor market policies.
Using employee-employer matched data and exploiting an exogenous abolishment of trade quo-
tas for China associated with its WTO accession, I utilize heterogeneity in workers’ exposure to
the exogenous trade shock within the same industry. This allows me to disentangle the effects
of the trade shock from potentially important technology and demand factors. Results show
that the MFA quota abolishment for China has substantial negative impact on Danish work-
ers’ earnings and employment trajectories over the period 2002-2010. These results suggest
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that trade with low-wage countries is indeed an important factor in shaping the income dis-
tribution in advanced countries. Showing that the trade shock with China drives a movement
of manufacturing workers to the service sector and the heterogeneity of their future success
there, the results also suggest that trade is an important factor contributing to the recent job
polarization observed in advanced countries.
A number of interesting features of workers’ adjustment to trade shocks are highlighted.
The removal of MFA quotas in conjunction with China’s accession to the WTO negatively
affects workers in firms exposed to increased competition in the short term regardless of age,
gender, education and occupation. The extent of the negative impact and the ability and time
needed for workers to recover from it, on the other hand, are crucially dependent on workers’
age, education and their initial occupation.
College educated workers, clerks and service workers and younger cohorts are found have the
best ability to recover from the initial negative shock. The service sector is the main absorber
of displaced workers and the ability of workers to recover from the negative impact of the quota
removal appears to depend on how well suited they are for jobs in the service sector. These
results point to the importance of short-to-medium term adjustment costs of globalization and
inform policy makers about the most vulnerable.
Shorter employment spells are found to be the main channel through which workers are affected
from the MFA shock, rather than a decline in their initial and/or subsequent hourly wages.
The quota removal causes a higher likelihood of unemployment in affected workers, but does
not appear to drive workers out of the labor market altogether. These results allow an informed
discussion of whether institutional differences play an important role in shaping the adjustment
mechanism.
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Table 2: Fixed Effects: Impact of MFA Shock By Education, 2002-2010
Workers with:
College Vocational at most High
Education Education School Diploma
(α̂1) (α̂1) (α̂1)
A. Annual Salary -0.056 -0.028 -0.092***
(0.031) (0.015) (0.017)
B. Annual Salaries (all) -0.010 -0.036* -0.092***
(0.032) (0.018) (0.019)
C. Personal Income 0.018 0.000 -0.044***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.013)
D. Hours Worked -0.037* -0.036*** -0.053***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.010)
E. Hours Worked (all) -0.052 -0.086*** -0.110***
(0.035) (0.022) (0.023)
F Hourly Wage 0.011 0.004 0.010
(0.014) (0.007) (0.006)
G Hourly Wage (all) 0.017 0.011 -0.001
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007)
H. Unemployment 0.021 0.083*** 0.136***
(0.032) (0.020) (0.017)
Notes: All regressions include year and person fixed effects. All dependent variables are in logarithmic form. A constant is included but
not reported. Due to differences in data sources, and availabilities the number of observations vary. The numbers of observations in Panel
A are 13561, 40775 and 60440 respectively across columns towards right. Similarly in Panel B, they are 14445, 44326 and 67226. Panel C:
14805, 50104, 78744. Panel D: 13112, 39496, 56494. Panel E: 8601, 25503, 37693. Panel F: 13112, 39496, 56494. Panel G: 8601, 25503,
37693. Panel H: 12322, 40426, 65274. Data Source: Statistics Denmark.
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Table 3: MFA Quota Abolishment and Earnings, 2002-2010
Sample: All Workers with primary occupation in T&C sector in 1999
A. Cumulative Earnings 2002-2010 (in multiples of initial annual wage)
AffW (β̂1) -0.722*** -0.616*** -0.657*** -0.695***
(0.190) (0.179) (0.175) (0.175)
Demographic Controls no yes yes yes
Occupation Types no no yes yes
Education Levels no no yes yes
Unemployment History no no yes yes
Initial Wage no no yes yes
Initial Workplace Controls no no no yes
B. Cumulative Employment 2002-2010
AffW (β̂1) -0.020 0.045 0.005 0.009
(0.055) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Demographic Controls no yes yes yes
Occupation Types no no yes yes
Education Levels no no yes yes
Unemployment History no no yes yes
Initial Wage no no yes yes
Initial Workplace Controls no no no yes
C. Earnings per Year of Employment 2002-2010 (in initial annual wage)
AffW (β̂1) -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.125*** -0.132***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Demographic Controls no yes yes yes
Occupation Types no no yes yes
Education Levels no no yes yes
Unemployment History no no yes yes
Initial Wage no no yes yes
Initial Workplace Controls no no no yes
Notes: In Panel A, B, and C the number of observations are 11385, 11385, and 10595 respectively. A constant is included but not reported. Demographic
controls are gender dummy, immigration status dummy, and age quartiles. Occupation types are indicator variables whether an individual was
employed in 1999 having a high-level, intermediate-level, base level, or auxiliary/unspecified occupation (outside category). Education levels are
dummy variables indicating whether an individual has at most high school degree, vocational training (after high school) or college and above degree
in 1999. Unemployment history is the number of years between 1980-1999 that the individual spent as an unemployed person. Initial wage is the
logarithm of the average hourly wage of an individual (from his/her primary occupation in T&C) in 1999 and 2000. Initial workplace controls are the
logarithm of the average hourly wage in the workplace in 1999, and the separation rate in 1999 (percentage of employees that left the workplace). Data
Source: Statistics Denmark.
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Table 4: MFA Quota Abolishment and Earnings, 2002-2010
Sample: All Full-Time Workers with primary occupation in T&C sector
for more than a year continuous tenure in the workplace in 1999
A. Cumulative Earnings 2002-2010 (in multiples of initial annual wage)
AffW (β̂1) -0.320** -0.255* -0.319** -0.339**
(0.121) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117)
Demographic Controls no yes yes yes
Occupation Types no no yes yes
Education Levels no no yes yes
Unemployment History no no yes yes
Initial Wage no no yes yes
Initial Workplace Controls no no no yes
B. Cumulative Employment 2002-2010
AffW (β̂1) -0.142* -0.059 -0.078 -0.067
(0.067) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Demographic Controls no yes yes yes
Occupation Types no no yes yes
Education Levels no no yes yes
Unemployment History no no yes yes
Initial Wage no no yes yes
Initial Workplace Controls no no no yes
C. Earnings per year of employment 2002-2010 (in initial annual wage)
AffW (β̂1) -0.036** -0.040** -0.047*** -0.052***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Demographic Controls no yes yes yes
Occupation Types no no yes yes
Education Levels no no yes yes
Unemployment History no no yes yes
Initial Wage no no yes yes
Initial Workplace Controls no no no yes
Notes: In Panel A, B, and C the number of observations are 7465, 7465, and 6960 respectively. A constant is included but not reported. Demographic
controls are gender dummy, immigration status dummy, and age quartiles. Occupation types are indicator variables whether an individual was
employed in 1999 having a high-level, intermediate-level, base level, or auxiliary/unspecified occupation (outside category). Education levels are
dummy variables indicating whether an individual has at most high school degree, vocational training (after high school) or college and above degree
in 1999. Unemployment history is the number of years between 1980-1999 that the individual spent as an unemployed person. Initial wage is the
logarithm of the average hourly wage of an individual (from his/her primary occupation in T&C) in 1999 and 2000. Initial workplace controls are the
logarithm of the average hourly wage in the workplace in 1999, the separation rate in 1999 (percentage of employees that left the workplace). Data
Source: Statistics Denmark.
37
T
ab
le
5:
M
F
A
Q
u
ot
a
A
b
ol
is
h
m
en
t
an
d
E
ar
n
in
gs
,
20
02
-2
01
0
W
o
rk
e
rs
w
it
h
p
ri
m
a
ry
o
c
c
u
p
a
ti
o
n
in
T
&
C
se
c
to
r
in
1
9
9
9
(a
)
(b
)
(c
)
(d
)
(e
)
(f
)
A
ll
In
it
ia
l
F
ir
m
o
th
er
T
&
C
o
th
er
M
a
n
u
f
S
er
v
ic
e
T
h
e
R
es
t
A
.
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
E
a
rn
in
g
s
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
a
n
n
u
a
l
w
a
g
e
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.6
95
**
*
-0
.9
5
0
*
*
*
0
.0
6
8
-0
.0
7
4
0
.2
9
0
-0
.0
2
9
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.0
6
7
)
(0
.0
6
0
)
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.1
6
1
)
(0
.0
4
5
)
B
.
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
0.
00
9
-0
.8
7
0
*
*
*
0
.1
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
8
0
0
.6
6
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
(0
.0
5
5
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
C
.
E
a
rn
in
g
s
p
e
r
y
e
a
r
o
f
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
a
n
n
u
a
l
w
a
g
e
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.1
32
**
*
-0
.0
2
1
*
-0
.0
4
0
-0
.1
1
2
-0
.1
4
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
5
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.0
6
4
)
(0
.0
3
9
)
(0
.0
9
7
)
D
.
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
H
o
u
rs
W
o
rk
e
d
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
a
n
n
u
a
l
h
o
u
rs
w
o
rk
e
d
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.5
47
**
*
-0
.9
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
9
6
*
-0
.0
3
7
0
.3
2
4
*
*
-0
.0
1
9
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.0
6
0
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.0
6
7
)
(0
.1
0
1
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
E
.
H
o
u
rs
W
o
rk
e
d
p
e
r
y
e
a
r
o
f
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
a
n
n
u
a
l
h
o
u
rs
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.1
02
**
*
-0
.0
1
7
*
*
-0
.0
4
6
*
-0
.0
8
8
*
-0
.1
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
0
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
3
9
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
F
.
H
o
u
rl
y
R
a
te
p
e
r
y
e
a
r
o
f
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
h
o
u
rl
y
ra
te
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
0
9
0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
1
5
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
2
3
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
5
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
N
o
te
s:
In
P
a
n
e
ls
A
,
B
a
n
d
D
,
th
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
1
1
3
8
5
.
In
P
a
n
e
ls
C
,
E
,
a
n
d
F
th
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
d
e
c
re
a
si
n
g
fr
o
m
1
0
5
9
5
,
1
0
4
8
1
,
a
n
d
1
0
4
8
1
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
in
c
o
lu
m
n
s
a
th
ro
u
g
h
f.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
th
e
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
.
A
c
o
n
st
a
n
t
is
in
c
lu
d
e
d
b
u
t
n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
e
d
.
T
h
e
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
d
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
(a
g
e
,
g
e
n
d
e
r,
im
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
st
a
tu
s)
,
o
c
c
u
p
a
ti
o
n
ty
p
e
s,
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
le
v
e
ls
,
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
h
is
to
ry
,
in
it
ia
l
w
a
g
e
a
n
d
th
e
in
it
ia
l
w
o
rk
p
la
c
e
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
s
d
e
sc
ri
b
e
d
in
ta
b
le
n
o
te
s
o
f
T
a
b
le
s
3
-4
.
D
a
ta
S
o
u
rc
e
:
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
D
e
n
m
a
rk
.
38
T
ab
le
6
:
M
F
A
Q
u
ot
a
A
b
ol
is
h
m
en
t
an
d
E
ar
n
in
gs
,
20
02
-2
01
0
:
A
ll
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s
W
o
rk
e
rs
w
it
h
fu
ll
-t
im
e
p
ri
m
a
ry
o
c
c
u
p
a
ti
o
n
in
T
&
C
se
c
to
r
in
1
9
9
9
w
it
h
m
o
re
th
a
n
a
y
e
a
r
c
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
te
n
u
re
(a
)
(b
)
(c
)
(d
)
(e
)
(f
)
A
ll
In
it
ia
l
F
ir
m
o
th
er
T
&
C
o
th
er
M
a
n
u
f
S
er
v
ic
e
T
h
e
R
es
t
A
.
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
E
a
rn
in
g
s
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
a
n
n
u
a
l
w
a
g
e
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.3
39
**
-1
.1
4
1
*
*
*
0
.0
8
9
0
.0
4
0
0
.6
8
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
7
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.0
8
2
)
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
7
7
)
(0
.1
0
0
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
B
.
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.0
67
-1
.0
4
9
*
*
*
0
.1
2
1
*
0
.0
8
3
0
.7
7
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
6
6
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
C
.
E
a
rn
in
g
s
p
e
r
y
e
a
r
o
f
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
a
n
n
u
a
l
w
a
g
e
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.0
52
**
*
-0
.0
1
8
*
*
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
5
5
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
7
6
)
D
.
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
H
o
u
rs
W
o
rk
e
d
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
a
n
n
u
a
l
h
o
u
rs
w
o
rk
e
d
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.4
07
**
*
-1
.0
6
0
*
*
*
0
.1
0
6
*
0
.0
3
8
0
.5
2
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
2
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
6
4
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
E
.
H
o
u
rs
W
o
rk
e
d
p
e
r
y
e
a
r
o
f
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
a
n
n
u
a
l
h
o
u
rs
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
-0
.0
59
**
*
-0
.0
1
1
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
4
7
-0
.0
5
3
*
*
-0
.0
6
5
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
6
9
)
F
.
H
o
u
rl
y
R
a
te
p
e
r
y
e
a
r
o
f
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
0
2
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
in
it
ia
l
h
o
u
rl
y
ra
te
)
A
ff
W
(β̂
1
)
0.
00
9
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
4
5
*
*
*
0
.0
5
3
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
N
o
te
s:
In
P
a
n
e
ls
A
,
B
,
a
n
d
D
th
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
7
4
6
5
.
In
P
a
n
e
ls
C
,
E
,
a
n
d
F
,
th
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
d
e
c
re
a
si
n
g
fr
o
m
6
9
6
0
,
6
8
9
5
,
a
n
d
6
8
9
5
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
in
c
o
lu
m
n
s
a
th
ro
u
g
h
f.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
th
e
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
.
A
c
o
n
st
a
n
t
is
in
c
lu
d
e
d
b
u
t
n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
e
d
.
T
h
e
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
d
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
(a
g
e
,
g
e
n
d
e
r,
im
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
st
a
tu
s)
,
o
c
c
u
p
a
ti
o
n
ty
p
e
s,
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
le
v
e
ls
,
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
h
is
to
ry
,
in
it
ia
l
w
a
g
e
a
n
d
th
e
in
it
ia
l
w
o
rk
p
la
c
e
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
s
d
e
sc
ri
b
e
d
in
ta
b
le
n
o
te
s
o
f
T
a
b
le
s
3
-4
.
D
a
ta
S
o
u
rc
e
:
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
D
e
n
m
a
rk
.
39
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Year
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Earnings in Initial Earnings since 2002
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 V
al
ue
s
 
 
Year by Year Regression Coefficients
95 % Confidence Interval
(a) Overall Impact
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Year
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Earnings in Initial Earnings since 2002
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 V
al
ue
s
 
 
Overall
at Initial Workplace
at T&C Jobs
at other Manufacturing Jobs
at Service Jobs
(b) Sectoral Decomposition
Figure 1: Year by Year Impact on the Cumulative Earnings
All regressions include a constant and the full set of controls, ZWi,99 and Z
F
i,99.
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Figure 2: Year by Year Impact on the Cumulative Employment
All regressions include a constant and the full set of controls, ZWi,99 and Z
F
i,99.
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Figure 3: Year by Year Impact on the Cumulative Hours Worked
All regressions include a constant and the full set of controls, ZWi,99 and Z
F
i,99.
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Figure 4: Year by Year Impact on the Cumulative Earnings Since 1999
All regressions include a constant and the full set of controls, ZWi,99 and Z
F
i,99.
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Appendix A
Table A-1: Worker Characteristics in 1999: Demographics
AffW Age Female Immigrant Experience
Whole Sample: All T&C workers employed in 1999
Mean 0.446 39.987 0.557 0.063 13.855
N 13008 13008 13008 13008 13008
Restricted Sample: Full-Time T&C workers employed in 1999
Mean 0.475 40.813 0.549 0.065 14.938
N 10985 10985 10985 10985 10985
Restricted Sample: Full-Time, more than 1 year continuous tenure
Mean 0.471 42.006 0.523 0.055 15.740
N 7829 7829 7829 7829 7829
Variables AffW, Female, and Immigrant are worker-level indicator variables. The variable AffW takes value 1 when a worker’s primary employer
domestically produces an MFA good. The variable Experience shows the number of years since 1980 that a worker worked as an employee (paid
ATP). Data Source: Statistics Denmark.
Table A-2: Worker Characteristics in 1999: Occupation, Education and Wages I
High-Level Mid-Level Base-Level Log Hourly
Occupations Occupations Occupations Wage
Whole Sample: All T&C workers employed in 1999
Mean 0.087 0.118 0.610 4.970
N 13008 13008 13008 11833
Restricted Sample: Full-Time T&C workers employed in 1999
Mean 0.070 0.133 0.656 4.991
N 10985 10985 10985 10849
Restricted Sample: Full-Time, more than 1 year continuous tenure
Mean 0.083 0.143 0.637 5.006
N 7829 7829 7829 7819
Variables High-Level, Mid-Level and Base-level Occupations are worker-level indicator variables that take value 1 if a worker’s primary
employment is classified under the respective occupation category. The variable Hourly Wage is only calculated for individuals with high
quality data as indicated by Statistics Denmark. Values are expressed in constant year 2000 Danish Kroner. Data Source: Statistics
Denmark.
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Table A-3: Worker Characteristics in 1999: Occupation, Education and Wages II
College + Vocational High School − Log Annual
Education Education Education Salary
Whole Sample: All T&C workers employed in 1999
Mean 0.105 0.341 0.529 11.973
N 13008 13008 13008 12686
Restricted Sample: Full-Time T&C workers employed in 1999
Mean 0.113 0.362 0.499 12.172
N 10985 10985 10985 10985
Restricted Sample: Full-Time, more than 1 year continuous tenure
Mean 0.116 0.373 0.487 12.373
N 7829 7829 7829 7829
Variables College +, Vocational and High School − Education are worker-level indicator variables that take value 1 if a worker’s highest
educational attainment is classified under the respective category. Values are expressed in constant year 2000 Danish Kroner. Data
Source: Statistics Denmark.
Table A-4: Workplace Characteristics in 1999
Whole Sample: All T&C workers employed in 1999
No. of Log Avg. Negative Positive Separation
Employees Hourly Wage Trend Trend Rate
Mean 114.918 5.027 0.441 0.236 27.227
N 12949 12770 12709 12709 12935
Restricted Sample: Full-Time T&C workers employed in 1999
Mean 122.387 5.038 0.449 0.222 25.829
N 10942 10908 10819 10819 10942
Restricted Sample: Full-Time, more than 1 year continuous tenure
Mean 126.316 5.041 0.471 0.204 24.257
N 7829 7827 7789 7789 7829
Variables Negative Trend and Positive Trend are indicator variables. The variable Negative Trend
takes value 1 if a worker’s main employer’s size has decreased more than 5 percent relative to
November 1998. Similarly, the variable Positive Trend takes value 1 if a worker’s main employer’s
size has increased more than 5 percent relative to November 1998. The variable Separation Rate is
the rate at which employees leave a worker’s main workplace (defined as percentages). The variable
No. of Employees is the number of people that have been employed by a worker’s employer during
the year. Values are expressed in constant year 2000 Danish Kroner. Data Source: Statistics
Denmark.
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